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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-SUBSTANTIVE AND REMEDIAL STATUTES-EXTEN-
SION OF STATUTORY PERIOD FOR FRAUD-Plaintiff brought an action under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover damages from the defendant 
employer for an industrial disease allegedly contracted more than three 
years prior to bringing suit. Plaintiff alleged that defendant misrepresented 
the <time within which this action could be brought and thereby tolled 
the three-year statute of limitations in the FELA.1 Held, defendant's motion 
to dismiss granted. The time limitation is an integral part of the statute 
creating a substantive right and is not extended by fraud or misrepresen-
tation. Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) 154 
F. Supp. 863. 
Traditionally courts have distinguished between a period of limitations 
in a statute creating a cause of action unknown at common law and a 
general statute of limitations.2 Compliance with the former is deemed a 
condition precedent to the exercise of the new right and the period of 
limitations cannot be waived or tolled,3 so that the running of the 
statutory period extinguishes the right.4 This result has been criticized 
as being both a product of a misapplication of principles from the field 
of conflicts of law5 and, arguably, unnecessary. 6 In a few cases this distinc-
tion between substantive and remedial types of statutes either has been 
treated as not controlling or has been explained away, and the courts have 
tolled the running of statutes limiting substantive rights by applying the 
same equitable principles that toll a general remedial statute of limitations.7 
Apart from legislation, the granting of relief from the remedial statutes 
on grounds of fraud developed in equity courts and has carried over into 
actions at law.8 But the majority of courts in denying relief on grounds 
of fraud from substantive statutes appear to have disregarded the purposes 
behind periods of limitation, the principal one being fairness to the 
l 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §56 provides: "No action shall be 
maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the 
cause of action accrued." 
2 E.g., Bement v. Grand Rapids & Ind. Ry. Co., 194 Mich. 64 at 68, 160 N.W. 424 
(1916). 
3 See generally 15 A.L.R. (2d) 500 (1951). 
4 E.g., The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 at 214 (1886). 
5 See 132 A.L.R. 292 at 333 (1941). 
6 "Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations," 63 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1177 at 1188 
(1950), points out that the purpose of the limitation may only be to describe the effect 
of the expiration of the time limit set out, rather than to state the time at which the 
limitation bars the action; that is, that while the cause is extinguished when the period 
runs, usual equitable doctrines may be used to determine when that occurs. 
7Toran v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 564, and Scar-
borough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (4th Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 253, cert. den. 339 
U.S. 919 (1950), held that fraud tolled the statute of limitations in the FELA. See also 
the cases collected in 63 HARV. L. R.Ev. 711 (1950). 
8 See generally Dawson, "Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation," 31 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 591 at 597-606 (1933). 
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defendant.9 This purpose would not be frustrated if a defendant were 
held accountable for his misrepresentations through a suspension of the 
statutory period.10 One area in which tenuous conceptual distinctions have 
given way to effectuating legislative intent is in actions to obtain workmen's 
compensation benefits. Courts have been sympathetic toward these statutes' 
underlying purpose of enlarging upon the relief available at common 
law, and allow a plea of fraud to toll the period of limitations.11 Another 
solution to the problem of tolling under either type of statute of limitations 
has been suggested by medical malpractice cases in which there has been 
an intentional concealment of the cause of action. The decisions that do 
grant relief in such cases indicate that the statute begins to run only when 
the cause of action is discovered.12 But this theory of relief appears to be 
based upon public policy favoring the tolling of the statute in such 
situations, rather than upon treating the cause of action as not accruing 
until sometime after the act of negligence has occurred.13 Even this solution, 
however, appears to be unavailable where, as in the principal case, the 
plaintiff knows of his injury and of the defendant's connection with it, 
but the defendant by stating that plaintiff had seven years in which to 
sue has merely withheld a legal element of liability.14 Judicial intervention 
on equitable grounds has made even fewer inroads in the area of federal 
legislation containing built-in statutes of limitation. The probable purpose 
of Congress in inserting a period of limitations in a statute does not seem 
to be to extinguish one's rights completely when the statutory period has 
expired, but rather to adopt a uniform statutory period of limitation for 
9 "Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations," 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177 at 1185 
(1950), points to such additional considerations as increasing the effectiveness of the 
courts by barring the adjudication of tenuous claims, avoiding the disrupting effect 
unsettled claims exert upon commercial activities, varying the statutory period with the 
degree of permanence of the relevant evidence, and other variables depending upon 
particular parties and particular types of claims. 
10 Dawson, "Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation," 31 MICH. L. REv. 591 
at 605 (1933), points out, however, that if limitations serve only to bar stale claims, the. 
slightest tolling would undermine the statutes' purpose. 
11 See 15 A.L.R. (2d) 500 at 520 (1951). But see the cases collected in 67 A.L.R. 
1070 (1930) which reach the opposite result in actions based upon death statutes which 
appear to be a product of the same type of legislative intent. An equitable solution~ 
however, was finally reached in Desmarais v. People's Gas Light Co., 79 N.H. 195, 107 A. 
491 (1919), when the court found that fraudulent concealment did not toll the limitation 
in the Death Act, but that the plaintiff was not precluded from an action for damages. 
for defendant's deceit which resulted in the loss of the cause of action. 
12 See 42 IowA L. REv. 97 (1956). 
13 Ibid. 
H Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917). See also Dawson, "Fraudulent 
Concealment and Statutes of Limitation," 31 MICH. L. REv. 875 (1933). Even in Scar-
borough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (4th Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 253, cert. den. 339' 
U.S. 919 (1950), where fraud tolled the limitations in the FELA, the court emphasized 
the fact that the plaintiff was an infant. 
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this particular legislation.15 This purpose would not be defeated by 
judicial extension of the period on traditional equitable grounds.16 
Persuasive reasoning lies behind the decisions which make no distinction be-
tween types of statutes of limitations for purposes of applying equitable 
doctrines to toll the running of the statute.17 Thus the results reached 
through the tenuous distinction traditionally drawn between so-called 
statutes that condition the exercise of a new right and general remedial 
statutes of limitation indicate a need for a re-determination of legislative 
intent in cases involving fraud or misrepresentation by one seeking to take 
advantage of the statute. 
Max H. Bergman, S.Ed. 
15 Toran v. N.Y., N.H. &: H. R. Co., note 7 supra, at 566. See also 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 
'711 (1950). 
16 Ibid. 
17 The court in the principal case noted ,the persuasive reasoning that underlies 
the decisions that toll the built-in period of limitations in federal statutes, but felt 
.bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Principal case at 
866. 
